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1. Introduction 
The  literature  of  network  economics  and  platform  industries  has  expanded 
significantly in recent years
1. In this context, theoretical contributions on these areas 
have  been  numerous.  However,  there  seems  to  be  a  paucity  of  related  empirical 
research, mainly as a consequence of the lack of reliable data. It has been very often 
been argued that more empirical evidence on network industries is needed to test a 
number of theoretical predictions and to assist regulators and antitrust authorities in the 
supervision and monitoring of competitive and strategic trends in these markets
2.  
One of the main developments has taken place in payment cards services, which 
have typified industries with such interactions and network externalities, for both the 
firms and consumers involved. As payment cards have represented one of the main 
driving forces behind the development of modern retail financial services, competition 
authorities have paid increasing attention to them, both as an individual case and as a 
part of the entire range of financial services. Several antitrust authorities have argued 
that payment cards issuers have significantly increased their market power in recent 
years
3. This has also been the case of well-known controversial antitrust resolutions and 
class  action  lawsuits  against  card  associations  worldwide.  These  resolutions  have 
involved substantial changes in cards’ pricing schemes in several European countries 
and Australia. In the US, many card associations have been forced to pay enormous 
compensations  to  merchants  and  cardholders  for  damages
4.  Unlike  other  platform 
                                                
1 Two-sided platforms serve two groups of agents, so that the participation of, at least, one group raises 
the value (the ‘indirect’ network effect) of participating for the other group. Some examples are software, 
Internet  search  engines,  dating  and  employment  agencies,  some  telecommunication  systems  or 
videogames. 
2 See Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2004 and 2005) for an extensive description of these markets and research 
guidelines. 
3 This is the case, for example, of surcharges on ATM transactions in the US (Hannan et al., 2003). 
Similarly, the European Commission (2007) has suggested that some of the charges for consumers and 
merchants in several EU countries are abusive and need to be regulated.  
4 In Europe, the European Commission cleared Visa’s European cross-border interchange fees and found 
that merchants were restricted to accept cards by a ‘lock-in’ effect since they were somehow forced to   5 
industries  (e.g.  telecommunication  systems  or  software),  however,  the  competitive 
analysis of cards has been frequently undertaken using a standard, vertically organized, 
concept of the market, and antitrust agencies have often issued resolutions based upon 
this perception.  
  Although a wide range of non-banking financial and non-financial competitors 
are also card issuers, the role of cards is particularly relevant in the banking industry for 
various  reasons.  Firstly,  banks  are  the  main card  issuers  in  most financial  markets. 
Secondly, card services are usually offered as part of a set of banking products which, in 
turn,  are  frequently interrelated,  in terms of costs, revenues and prices. Finally, the 
majority of transactions take place at ATMs and POS (Point of Sale) machines which 
are  principally  provided  by  banks  and  determine  a  significant  proportion  of  card 
network externalities (Stavins and Gowrisankaran, 2004).  
  The  vertical  organization  of  ‘traditional’  bank  markets  may  often  shape  the 
regulatory  treatment  of  cards  i.e.  as  if  they  were  balance  sheet  assets.  However, 
compared  to  other  banking  services,  the  market  structure  of  cards  has  two  main 
distinctive  characteristics:  (i)  card  markets are  organized  as  network  systems  where 
consumers use cards at the ATMs or POS terminals of their own banks or those of their 
competitors. The value one user receives from ATM or POS terminals increases in line 
with the number of other users of that services; (ii) as payment instruments at the point 
                                                                                                                                          
offer the credit card payment service. The European Commission (2006) has also taken the preliminary 
view that MasterCard restricts competition between member banks by pre-determining a minimum price 
retailers must pay for accepting MasterCard and Maestro branded payment cards and an investigation is 
being  carried  out  in  that  sense.  This  type  of  antitrust  resolutions  have  been  particularly  relevant  in 
Australia,  where  an  Act  of  Parliament  in  2005  lead  the  Reserve  Bank  of  Australia  to  reform  the 
interchange fees schemes and to drastically reduce interchange fees. In the US, most resolutions have 
taken place in courts as a consequence of class action lawsuits. One of the most controversial was the 'tie-
in' arrangement imposed by Visa and MasterCard that forced any merchant accepting their credit cards to 
also accept their debit cards. Merchants took the credit card schemes to court –in what became known as 
the Wal-Mart case– arguing that the rule breached anti-trust laws. In April 2003, the case was finally 
settled,  with  Visa and  MasterCard  agreeing to abolish  the  rule,  reduce  the  interchange fee,  and  pay 
damages of $3 billion to merchants. There have also been several class actions against American Express 
in the US concerning non only card fees but also for providing financial plans incurring in conflicts of 
interest and poor disclosure which affects 2.4 million investors. The damage claims by the plaintiffs have 
reached $100 million dollars by 2007.     6 
of sale, card services are organized as a two-sided market, and thus banks offering POS 
services may satisfy two different groups of customers, namely consumers paying by 
card and merchants offering the POS terminal service. Bank networks have, therefore, 
to coordinate the activities of financial institutions that issue cards and provide ATMs, 
together with retail outlets that accept cards from consumers at POS terminals. On the 
one  hand,  this  may  increase  (at  least  theoretically)  consumers’  and  merchants’ 
willingness to pay
5. On the other hand, the inclusion of cards widens the range of the 
bank’s  product  bundle,  which  may  increase  the  bank’s  ability  to  differentiate  this 
product mix (Calem and Mester, 1995). Importantly, this requires a diffusion-related 
trend which guarantees a significant level of adoption by consumers (Molyneux and 
Shamrouk, 1996). Additionally, bank customer’s switching costs also augment as they 
contract  a  wider  product  range  (Stango,  2002).  Whether  the  shift  in  consumers’ 
willingness to pay exceeds the potential increase in market power or vice versa remains 
an unresolved empirical question.  
  The contribution of this study is twofold. Firstly, we provide evidence regarding 
changes in market power related to the supply of card payment services at multiproduct 
banks and the willingness of bank customers to pay for those services. Secondly, we 
estimate the welfare effects of incorporating such payment services to the bank multi-
output set. Of particular importance, the specific pricing structure and network effects of 
payment cards are estimated and incorporated into the estimations of market power and 
willingness  to  pay.  We  employ  a  unique  database  of  Spanish  banks  that  contains 
quarterly  bank-level  information  regarding  card  transactions  and  revenue  sources  at 
ATMs and POS terminals from 1997:1 to 2003:3. The focus of this paper is on the 
                                                
5 Such coordination, however, has  often produced  outcomes such as the collective setting  of certain 
prices. It is not surprising, therefore, that the payment card industry (and other two-sided markets and 
industries with network effects) has been closely scrutinized by antitrust authorities in many countries.   7 
overall effect of (debit and credit) card payments on bank market power and on bank 
customers’ willingness to pay
6.  
The paper is divided into six sections, apart from this introduction. Section 2 
reviews  the  theoretical  and  empirical  background  of  studies  on  market  structure, 
demand characteristics and antitrust policies in card markets. Section 3 presents the 
theoretical  framework  and  the  main  hypotheses.  Section  4  explains  the  data  and 
empirical methodologies employed. The main results are presented in Section 5, while 





2. Card services, industry structure and willingness to pay 
  2.1. Cards, network effects and two-sided markets 
  Payment cards function differently from most financial services, partly due to 
network effects. The more merchants (and ATMs) which accept a payment card, the 
more valuable it is to consumers. At the same time, merchants are more willing to 
accept a card if they know that many consumers use it
7. Together with network effects, 
a  second  distinctive  characteristic  of  the  market  structure  of  cards  is  that  they  are 
generally  organized  as  two-sided  markets.  In  these  markets,  two  (or  more)  parties 
interact on a "platform", and the interaction involves network externalities. In the two-
sided card market, the value of a network increases with every new consumer who uses 
                                                
6 The database contains information on both sides of the card markets: the number of total (debit and 
credit) cards is the proxy for the cardholders’ side while POS terminals are the proxy for the merchants’ 
side. In this paper no distinction can be made between debit and credit card operations due to lack of data 
by individual bank. 
7 See Economides and Himmelberg (1995) and Economides (1996) for a comprehensive study of network 
effects in card markets.    8 
cards, every merchant that accepts them at their point of sale and any other bank that 
accepts them at their ATMs
8.  
  Card markets also generate adoption and usage externalities. When a network is 
introduced  on  a  small  scale,  consumers  and  merchants  have  no  incentives  to  join. 
Therefore, banks launch large-scale ATM and POS networks which, in turn, implies the 
existence of significant barriers to entry in payment cards (Hunt, 2003). Similarly, usage 
externalities are related to consumers’ decisions regarding card use frequency. It is not 
surprising,  therefore,  that  banks  typically  offer  additional  advantages  (e.g.  "reward 
points") for card use. Merchants also enjoy additional incentives for accepting cards. In 
particular, cards increase consumers’ willingness to pay and, as a result, merchants who 
accept them increase their sales and make greater profits than merchants who do not 
(Wright, 2005).  
  All  the  abovementioned  incentives  for  bank  customers  (either  consumers  or 
merchants) also depend on the acceptance of two common rules: the ‘honor-all-cards’ 
rule and the ‘no-surcharge’ rule, which reduces the uncertainty that banks, consumers 
and  merchants  would  otherwise  face.  By  applying  the  ‘honor-all-cards’  rule  all  the 
networks agree to accept transactions made using cards from any other network at their 
ATM  and  POS  terminals.  The  ‘no-surcharge’  rule  applies  to  POS  transactions  and 
prevents  merchants  from  imposing  surcharges  on  customers  paying  by  card.  The 
combination of these two rules is presumed to increase the value of card networks and 
convenience for card users
9. However, two points should be borne in mind regarding the 
‘honor-all-cards’  and  ‘no-surcharging’  rules.  Firstly,  Katz  (2001)  questions  whether 
network effects are relevant for mature payment systems, particularly when consumers 
                                                
8 For banks, there are also advantages in deploying and sharing ATMs. Matutes and Padilla (1994) show 
that such banks' customers will tend to accept a lower return on their deposits, since such sharing lowers 
customers' expected transportation costs. 
9 These positive externalities of card networks (expanded use/acceptance) imply a negative externality to 
other payment networks based on cash or checks.   9 
must pay a fixed cost to employ an alternative payment method. However, as Hunt 
(2003)  notes,  the  use  of  cards  in  most  markets  is  not  yet  mature  and  the  relevant 
question is thus whether usage externalities remain significant under ‘no-surcharge’ and 
‘honor-all-cards’ rules. Secondly, the ‘honor-all-cards’ rule seems reasonable for card 
transactions  when  debit  and  credit  cards  or  ATMs  and  POS  terminals  compete  as 
substitutes, a question which empirical research has not so far answered. 
 
2.2. Pricing schemes and market power in card markets 
  The prices card issuers and network users face from the two sides (consumers 
and merchants) significantly affect market participation and overall demand volume in 
the payment cards market, especially as financial intermediaries generally bundle their 
services, offering their customers a choice of ‘packages’. In the case of cards, there are 
several prices which may be charged to or collected by the three main parties involved 
in the transaction: the cardholder, the cardholder’s bank, and the ATM (POS terminal) 
owner. Cardholders typically pay an annual fee for cards, principally credit cards. Card 
issuers also impose surcharges upon non-account holders for using the ATMs they own. 
The issuers also charge foreign fees when one of their customers uses another's ATM. 
Similarly,  in  payment  transactions  at  POS  terminals,  network  associations  usually 
demand that an interchange fee must be paid to the issuing bank by the bank acting as 
the acquirer for the merchant. Acquiring banks also charge a discount or service fee to 
merchants,  partly  to  compensate  for  the  interchange  fee  they  pay  to  issuers.  The 
complexity of this pricing scheme means that there may exist different and (at least 
partially) contradictory findings regarding the link between network effects and pricing 
decisions in ATM and POS networks.    10 
The main rationale for surcharges and foreign fees is that cardholders face a 
trade-off between the cost of a transaction if they travel to an ATM belonging to their 
own bank and the total price, which is the sum of the charges they face if they travel to a 
closer  ATM  (Chakravorti  and  Emmons,  2001).  McAndrews  (1996)  finds  that  both 
demand-side network effects and economies of scale influence such pricing decisions. 
Similarly, Hannan et al. (2003) find that the probability of surcharging is an increasing 
function  of  size  and  of  market  share  (of  ATMs)  and  that  depositors'  affiliation 
incentives lead to higher surcharges. Knittel and Stango (2006) show that surcharges 
and  foreign  fees  strengthen  compatibility  between  deposit  account  pricing  and  own 
ATMs, and weaken the relationship between deposit account pricing and competitors' 
ATMs and  related factors
10. The factor which has a considerable impact upon card 
prices  is  switching  costs  (i.e.  those  that  cardholders  pay  when  changing  their  card 
provider). As card fees increase, banks' market share of ATMs also increases, due to the 
existence  of  such  costs for  customers  with  high  outstanding  debt  balances  (Stango, 
2002).  Similarly,  product  differentiation  may  also  explain  why  card  prices  are 
frequently so sticky, as it has been found for credit cards (Calem and Mester, 1995). 
  The  case  of  interchange  and  service  fees  is  even  more  complex.  Networks 
usually  set  interchange  fees  collectively,  and  establishing  the  fee  at  the  network 
association level eliminates costs related to bargaining between individual card issuers 
and acquirers and uncertainty about the true costs of a card transaction (Baxter, 1983; 
Small and Wright, 2001).
11 In a seminal study, Baxter (1983) maintains that collective 
determination of interchange fees cannot be labeled as anticompetitive behavior, since 
                                                
10 Massoud and Berndhart (2002) also consider these compatibility effects and show that prohibiting 
banks from surcharging -by forcing banks to charge their own customers and the foreign customers the 
same ATM price- leads to higher ATM prices, greater bank profits, and possibly reduced consumer 
welfare. 
11  See,  for  example,  European  Commission  (2007).  See  also  Weiner  and  Wright  (2006),  for  a 
comprehensive survey of antitrust intervention in card markets.   11 
under perfect competition among issuers (and among acquirers) the socially optimal 
interchange fee is non-zero. By contrast, Carlton and Frankel, (1995), Frankel (1998), 
Chang and Evans (2000) and Balto (2002), indicate that the collective determination of 
interchange fees by payment card associations have potentially anticompetitive results. 
Recent studies, however, maintain that collective determination should not be banned, 
since it is unclear whether negotiations between issuers and acquirers would lead to 
lower  or  higher  interchange  fees  (Gans  and  King,  2003).  Schmalensee  (2002)  and 
Rochet and Tirole (2002) develop models of an imperfectly competitive payment card 
industry  -accepting  a  comparison  between  privately  optimal  and  socially  optimal 
interchange fees- and show that the proposal for cost-based regulation of interchange 
fees relies on an erroneous, vertically organized, model of the payment card industry, 
while  collective  determination  offers  no  incentives  to  achieve  socially  non-optimal 
interchange fees. In a similar vein, Wright (2004) shows that when merchants compete 
and consumers are fully informed whether merchants accept particular cards, the profit 
and welfare maximizing fee coincide for a non-trivial set of cases.  
 
  2.3. Payment cards: willingness to pay, costs and product differentiation  
  Card users' willingness to pay for debit and credit cards essentially depends on 
the  cost  savings  and  the  differentiation  gains  that  cards  may  offer  with  respect  to 
competing payment instruments, such as cash or checks. Regarding cost, studies by 
Humphrey  and  Berger  (1990)  or  Humphrey  et  al.  (1997)  have  shown  that efficient 
payment instrument pricing induces greater use of electronic payment, as it is cheaper 
than  paper-based  payment.  Nevertheless,  the  cost  advantages  of  cards  are  highly   12 
dependent on the type of card employed
12; Humphrey and Berger (1990) show that 
while  debit  cards  are  significantly  cheaper  than  cash,  credit  cards  are  relatively 
expensive  payment  instruments.  The  latter  deserve  specific  attention  because  their 
characteristics are not identical to those of debit cards. Hancock and Humphrey (1997) 
argue that the substitutability of credit cards for cash is dependent on both pricing and 
on national cultural attitudes towards credit. It has also been observed that credit cards 
help to shift illiquid customer consumption forward in time (Chakravorti and To, 2000). 
Since credit card fees are largely borne by retailers, consumers perceive credit cards as a 
low-cost delayed payment substitute for cash settlements. The willingness to pay for 
credit cards is, therefore, based principally upon perceptions and liquidity restrictions. 
Furthermore, Brito and Hartley (1995) demonstrate that although borrowing on credit 
cards may appear irrational, due to the higher prices usually paid
13, such cards also 
provide liquidity services by allowing customers to avoid some of the opportunity costs 
of holding money. 
  In addition to cost savings and liquidity advantages, product differentiation is 
fundamental  in  explaining  consumer  willingness  to  pay  for  card  services.  Banks 
providing  cards  and  ATMs  may  extend  their  deposit  services  outside  their  branch 
network, thereby enabling depositors to withdraw cash at more convenient times and 
places  (McAndrews,  2003).  ATMs  can  also  reduce  the  costs  of  servicing  various 
depositor demands, such as transfers among deposit accounts and bill payments. In the 
case of POS transactions, banks may act both as ‘issuers’ (of consumer cards) and as 
‘acquirers’  (i.e.  providing  merchants  with  POS  terminals);  in  both cases,  they  offer 
                                                
12 Saunders et al. (2007) survey the literature of debit cards, credit cards, ATMs and POS and offer some 
empirical evidence on consumers’ decisions on the different payment devices. They show that a certain 
degree of substitution exists between the use of cards at ATM and POS terminals.  
13 Ausubel (1991), Calem and Mester (1995) or Knittel and Stango (2003) have shown the inflexibility of 
credit card interest rates, relative to the cost of funds, as evidence of the rigidity of relatively high prices 
in credit card markets.   13 
convenience. As a consequence of the wide range of interactions among acquirers and 
issuers,  banks  tend  to  coordinate  these  activities  by  constructing  open  payment 
networks
14, allowing many banks to participate and facilitating transactions between 
merchants and cardholders.  
 
3. A theoretical framework 
Consider n banks and a set of an arbitrary number of identical consumers. Let N 
= {1,2,…,n} be the set of banks. Let us assume that each bank i produces a set of 
outputs (y) with a given vector of inputs (x), so that a vector of netputs could be defined 
for each bank as Qi = (y, -x) = (Q1,…, Qm, -x1, …, -xn). Let us further suppose that the 
set  of  outputs  y  of  each  bank  is  a  vector  that  contains  m  outputs,  so  that 
y (1,2,..., ) M m ∈ = ,  including  m-1  balance  sheet  banking  outputs  plus  one  additional 
output consisting of card payment services (Qc), and thus the multiproduct set for each 
bank is composed of any given but positive demanded quantity of the different outputs 
y=(Q1,…,  Qm-1,  Qc),  Qi  >0.  Let  p  =  (p1,…,  pn-1,  pc)  be  the  price  set  of  bank  i 
corresponding  to  the  output  set  y.  We  assume  that  banks  compete  in  a  Bertrand 
oligopoly  fashion;  that  is  to  say,  they  select  their  prices  independently  and 
simultaneously. In the second stage, consumers observe the price vector p of each bank 
and select their consumption set S =S
￿
(p), where S M ⊆ . Consumer payoff corresponds 
to the consumer surplus (cs(p,S
￿
(p))), defined as the difference between the willingness 
to pay for the set of outputs (v(S
￿
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14 In a close network the card issuer also acts as the acquirer.    14 
Bank payoff ( j π ) corresponds to the mark-up of price (pj) over marginal costs (
'
j c ): 
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In this model, it is possible that consumers access different bank products as a 
choice of packages. In banking markets, consumers usually shop at one bank where they 
have a loan, a deposit account and different payment services, including debit and credit 
cards (‘one-stop’ banking)
15. It is possible to interpret the model allowing for strategies 
such as price bundling. This will require different assumptions regarding the effect of 
such bundling strategies upon price competition. For the sake of simplicity, we initially 
assume  that  the  choice  of  packages  does  not  imply  that  the  bundle  is  offered  at  a 
discount.  Instead,  we  assume  that  the  bundle  allows  consumers  to  access  different 
products within the same bank and that the main rationale for this type of choice is 
convenience
16.  
If consumers access these different products at one single bank, then the sum of 
the prices paid by the consumer and the sum of the prices offered by the bank will 
coincide. In this situation, the welfare effects of incorporating cards into the output 
bundle  will  then  depend  solely  on  the  difference  between  changes  in  consumer 
willingness to pay and changes in the bank’s marginal costs. Several scenarios may 
result from static comparisons of consumers’ surpluses and banks’ mark-up of prices 
over  marginal  costs  when  cards  are  excluded  or  included  in  the  multiproduct  set. 
Among  these,  two  are  particularly  relevant  when  analyzing  the  effects  of  the 
introduction  of  cards as  a  bank  output  upon  changes  in  bank  market  power  and  in 
consumers’  willingness  to  pay;  the  first  is  displayed  in  Figure  1.  For  the  sake  of 
                                                
15 This ‘one-stop’ banking assumption is generally accepted in the academic literature (Berger et al., 
1996) as a test on the value for consumers of universal banking (jointly provided or bundled) services. 
Recently, ‘one-stop’ banking services have also been subject to the scrutiny of Antitrust Authorities 
(European Commission, 2007, p.6)  
16 A more complete analysis of the effect of bundling within this theoretical framework is given by Liao 
and Tauman (2002).   15 
simplicity, the scenario reflects linear demands of output bundles and the behavior of a 
representative bank. In Scenario 1, the bank maximizes its profits by equaling marginal 
revenues (R’) to  marginal costs (c’), so that the  introduction  of cards in the output 
bundle increases consumers’ surpluses and the bank’s mark-up of price over marginal 
costs. These effects are reflected in the change from y1 (when Qc=0) to y2 (when Qc>0) 
and  related  changes  in  demand  (yD1  and  yD2).  In  Scenario  1,  there  is  a  transfer  of 
consumers’  surpluses  to  the  bank’s  profits,  although  the  net  change  in  consumers' 
surpluses is positive, due to the higher positive variation in consumers’ willingness to 
pay,  as a consequence of the introduction of cards that  shifts the demand for bank 
services  upwards.  In  Scenario  2  (Figure  2)  there  is  also  a  transfer  of  consumers’ 
surpluses to the bank’s profits. In this case, however, the net change in consumers' 
surpluses is negative, since the variation in consumer willingness to pay is lower than 
the  increase  in  bank  market  power  due  to  the  introduction  of  cards  in  the  bank 
multiproduct set. 
In order to assess the changes in bank market power and consumer willingness 
to  pay,  two  other  premises  should  be  considered,  in  order  to  provide  an  adequate 
understanding of market power and market definition in this framework: i) cards should 
correspond to the same retail market where banks sell the rest of the bundled products. 
Therefore, it should be demonstrated that cards correspond to the same market as loans, 
deposits and other retail services; ii) due to the particular characteristics of cards as 
payment services and, in particular, their two-sided nature, the relevant prices of these 
card  payments  must  be  calculated,  so  that  the  influences  of  market  power  can  be 
correctly identified.  
With  regard  to  the  initial  hypothesis,  cards  (or  any  other  bank  output)  are 
considered as part of banks' multi-output setting when demand for the output bundle is   16 
sufficiently inelastic for a hypothetical bank monopolist to impose a significant and 
non-transitory increase in card prices. The second hypothesis assumes that cards will 
belong to a two-sided market when the volume of transactions of all users (cardholders 
and merchants) depends not only on the structure (the prices paid by both cardholders 
and merchants) but also on the overall level of the fees charged by the bank (Rochet and 
Tirole, 2005; Evans and Noel, 2005). The latter premise does not imply, however, that if 
cards belong to a two-sided market, the correct prices to assess market power from card 
supply should be divided between cardholders’ and merchants’ prices. As Emch and 
Thomson (2005) note, the “two-sidedness” of the markets does not refute the basic logic 
of the hypothetical monopolist test of the traditional measurement of market power, and 
thus the total price of cards (for both cardholders and merchants) should be employed to 
calculate market power.  
 
4. Data and empirical methodology 
  4.1. Empirical objectives and data 
  Mainly  due  to  the  lack  of  available  data,  few  empirical  studies  deal 
simultaneously  with  both  willingness  to  pay  and  the  competitive  issues  in  network 
industries. Our paper attempts to separate willingness to pay for cards from any source 
of market power in this context. There are three main empirical objectives: 
(i)  To  assess  the  changes  in  market  power  from  the  introduction  of  card 
payments  into  banking  services,  as  well  as  the  appropriate  pricing  and 
market definition for such banking services. 
(ii)  To  estimate  consumer  willingness  to  pay  for  cards.  Such  willingness  is 
analyzed  both  from  a  qualitative  perspective  (employing  hedonic 
regressions)  and  a  quantitative  perspective  (estimating  changes  in  the   17 
willingness to pay for a bundle of bank services that alternatively includes 
and excludes card services). 
(iii)  To distinguish changes in willingness to pay as a result of the inclusion of 
cards in banks' multiproduct set from any source of market power derived 
from this inclusion. This empirical goal involves the simultaneous estimation 
of a system of demand and supply relationships, in order to perform a ‘mark-
up test’ that permits the quantification of the percentage deviation of prices, 
quantities (and, therefore, revenues) from perfect competition levels.  
We  employ  a  unique  database  that  contains  quarterly  bank-level  information 
regarding total card transactions –the sum of debit and credit card transactions-, and 
revenue  sources  at  ATMs  and  POS  terminals,  as  well  as  other  bank  information. 
Importantly, the database contains information on both the number of cards –as a proxy 
of the cardholders’ side- and the number of POS –as a proxy of the merchants’ side- so 
that both dimensions of the two-sided card market are captured. No distinction can be 
made between debit and credit card transactions due to lack of data by individual bank. 
The sample consists of all savings banks operating in Spain from 1997:1 to 2003:3, 
constituting 1,242 panel observations. These savings banks belong to two of the three 
competing networks in Spain
17 and are involved in approximately 60% of total card 
payment transactions. The Spanish case is representative, since Spain is the world's 
second largest ATM and POS industry
18 (55,399 ATMs and 1,055,103 POS machines at 
the end of 2004)
19.  
                                                
17 These networks are Euro6000 and Servired. Euro6000 is organized solely as a network for savings 
banks, while all commercial banks, other savings banks and credit cooperatives belong to Servired.   
18 According to the figures contained in the Blue Book on Payment and Securities Settlement Systems 
(European Central Bank) and the Red Book on Payment and Settlement Systems (Bank for International 
Settlements), only the United States shows a higher absolute number of ATMs and POS terminals. 
19 The recent evolution of the Spanish card market is also interesting. The number of cards has almost 
doubled from 1996 (33,189,000) to 2004 (63,027,000). However, the number of transactions per ATM 
has declined during the same period (from 19,121 in 1996 to 16,336 in 2004), although the absolute 
volume of transactions rose  from 582  million euros to  905 million euros (a  net increase  of  55.5%).   18 
The definition and summary statistics of the variables employed in this empirical 
section are shown in Table 1. 
 
4.2. Market power, market definition and mark-ups 
As an initial empirical step, it is critical to measure market power. According to 
the theoretical framework described in Section 3, changes in market power are reflected 
in  the  mark-up  of  prices  over  marginal  costs.  This  involves  the  estimation  of  the 
marginal costs of bank outputs, including card services. Furthermore, the cost function 
employed needs to be sufficiently flexible to reflect the non-linear shape of the different 
marginal costs estimated. Following Pulley and Braunstein (1992), we employ the fairly 
flexible composite cost function, a full description of which is provided in Appendix A. 
To estimate the composite function, three inputs (k = 1, …,3) are used: the price of 
deposits, labor and physical capital. The output bundle consists of five outputs including 
loans, deposits, other earning assets, the value of card transactions at ATMs and the 
value of card transactions at POS. Prices are computed directly from balance sheet, 
income statement and card reports information described in Table 1. In order to reflect 
both absolute and relative margins we also compute the ratio of the mark-up of price 
over marginal costs (Lerner index). 
According to the premises of the theoretical framework, an initial and necessary 
condition to compute the effect upon market power of incorporating cards into bank 
services is to effectively demonstrate that such cards do in fact form part of the same 
market as the other products offered together with them. The standard test employed is 
                                                                                                                                          
Interestingly, the number of bank tellers increased even further, from 30,437 to 55,399 during the same 
period (a net increase of 81.8%).  In contrast, the number of transactions per POS terminal has increased 
from 511 in 1996 to 1,204 in 2004, while the absolute change in the volume of POS transactions has risen 
from 294 million to 1,271 million euros (a net increase of 332.3%). The number of POS terminals has 
also increased, in the same period, from 575,325 to 1,055,103 (a net increase of 83.39%). It is important 
to  note  that  the  ‘no-surcharge’  and  the  ‘honor-all-card’  rules  apply  in  Spain  and,  as  in  many  other 
countries, there has been an intense debate regarding the fees banks charge for cardholder and merchant 
transactions.   19 
the SSNIP test.
20 It assumes that a profit-maximizing bank offers a set of products (M), 
which,  in  our  case,  alternatively  corresponds  to  a  three-output  or  a  five-output 
(including  card  transactions  at  ATMs  and  POS)  definition  of  the  multiproduct 
composite function. The SSNIP test estimates whether a hypothetical profit-maximizing 
monopoly supplier could impose a significant and non-transitory increase in prices for a 
particular product (payment cards, in this case). Adopting this definition, the SSNIP is 
implemented  as  a  variation  in  profits  for  a  product  J  in  the  bundle  of  M  outputs 
( , M J π ∆ ). The standard 5% and 10% variation in prices are taken into account and the 
prices are set constant at their means for purposes of comparison ( j p ): 




























              (3) 
  The second premise, when studying changes in market power resulting from the 
introduction of payment cards by banks, is that card prices are correctly chosen. In order 
to study the two-sided nature of card payments, we therefore include both the prices 
paid  by  cardholders  (pc),  computed  as  the  ratio  of  “cardholder  fees/cardholder 
transactions” and the prices paid by merchants (pm), computed as the ratio of “merchant 
fees/transactions at POS”. We will assume that card markets are two-sided if total prices 
(p=pc+pm) significantly affect not only total card transactions, but also each of the two 
prices  separately.  This  test  is  performed  as  a  log-linear  approximation  of  demand 
curves, employing fixed-effects panel data techniques which relate these prices to the 
                                                
20 The SSNIP test was initially proposed by the US Department of Justice’s Merger Guidelines. The 
SSNIP test is defined as the Small, but Significant, Non-transitory Increase in Price that causes profits to 
vary significantly. Approaches to market definitions in banking using the SSNIP test are rare. There is 
only, to our knowledge, one study dealing with such market definitions using this approach and residual 
deposit supply equations (Amel and Hannan, 1999).   20 
total card transactions. The log of both GDP and population density are also included as 
control variables in these equations. 
 
4.3. Willingness to pay for card services: hedonic regressions methodology 
  We  estimate  a  series  of  hedonic  regressions  of  various  output  prices  on  the 
characteristics of banks' own and their competitors’ services, in an initial attempt to 
analyze consumer willingness to pay for cards. This involves examining the relationship 
between the pricing of card payments and various bank characteristics and strategies. 
There are, at least, two advantages of employing hedonic regressions. Firstly, given 
certain  assumptions,  hedonic  regressions  will  show  the  marginal  effect  of  these 
characteristics on customers'  willingness to pay. Secondly, they help to identify the 
cross-effects of card use at ATMs and POS terminals as possible substitutes.  
  The seminal contribution of Rosen (1974) explains the interpretation of hedonic 
regressions as ‘willingness to pay’. However, hedonic regressions cannot always be 
strictly  interpreted as  utility  parameters,  since  they  reflect  other  influences,  such as 
changes  in  costs  and  related  variations  in  market  power.  Pakes  (2003)  shows  that 
hedonic  valuation  is  the  expectation  of  marginal  costs  plus  that  of  the  mark-up 
conditional upon ‘own product characteristics’. The hedonic approach views products as 
bundles of characteristics that are valuable to consumers, displaying the marginal values 
of these characteristics to the typical consumer. In our approach, we identify various 
characteristics of the price of card use at ATMs as well as the price of card use at POS 
terminals, since these are the two main relevant delivery channels. The specification of 
the hedonic regression is in line with Knittel and Stango (2006) for ATMs
21, as follows: 
                                                
21 In particular, Stango (2006) analyses the effects of surcharges on the compatibility between deposits 
and ATMs and demonstrates the effects of compatibility upon depositors' evaluations of various bank 
services.   21 
log( ) log( ) log( ) it it i it it it p X M B β µ χ ε = + + + +       (4)   
where log( ) it p  is the logarithm of the price of card use at ATMs and the price of card 
use  at  POS  of  bank  i  and  time  t.  it X is  a  vector  of  the  characteristics  of  own  and 
competitors’ bank services, including own ATM density; competitors’ ATM density; 
own  POS  terminal  density;  competitors’  POS  terminal  density.  It  also  contains 
interactions  terms  to  capture  indirect  network  effects,  namely:  logarithm  of  [(card 
growth) x (own ATMs)]; logarithm of [(competitors’ ATMs) x (own card issuance)]; 
logarithm of [(card growth) x (own POS terminals)]; logarithm of [(competitors’ POS 
terminals) x (own card issuance)]; and the logarithm of own branches. These variables 
reflect own and indirect network effects from offering ATMs and POS terminals as well 
as the effects of each device upon the other. Branches are also included as a measure of 
convenience for traditional bank services. All these variables are taken in logs in order 
to reflect marginal effects.  i µ  is a vector of individual bank persistent heterogeneity. 
it M  is an individual measure of market power that also varies over time.  it B  is a set of 
bank-specific  environmental  control  variables,  including  the  growth  rate  of  cards 
(reflecting  bank  investment  in  the  card  market)  and  regional
22  values  of  GDP, 
population density and salary levels.    
 
  4.4. Complementarities in consumption: willingness to pay, joint production 
and network effects 
   The use of hedonic regressions provides an initial qualitative approach to the 
use  of  cards  at  ATM  and  POS  and  the  related  bank  strategies  that  may  affect 
consumers’ convenience and their willingness to pay for such services.  However, we 
                                                
22 The regional variable is obtained as a weighted average of the values of the variable in the different 
regions where the bank operates, using the regional distribution of branches as the weighting factor.   22 
also aim to offer a quantitative approach that provides a point estimate of changes in 
consumers’ willingness to pay and market power when cards are included in the output 
bundle. 
  The empirical approach we employ to assess consumers’ willingness to pay for a 
combined set of bank products is similar to that utilized by Berger et al. (1996).  Under 
certain  conditions,  revenue  scope  economies  will  illustrate  synergies  in  the  joint 
consumption of financial services. For banks to obtain greater revenues in the joint 
production of financial services, output prices must vary according to different output 
mixes.  Nonetheless,  revenue  economies  of  scope  would  exist  in  a  competitive 
environment only if: (i) consumers are willing to pay a premium for jointly provided 
financial services; and (ii) there are cost diseconomies of scope. If there were no cost 
justification for charging higher prices for jointly provided services, competition among 
banks  would  eliminate  revenue  synergies,  even  if  consumers  valued  jointness. 
Therefore, the coexistence of cost and revenue scope economies will only be possible in 
a less than perfectly competitive environment. Potential reductions in transaction and 
searching costs for customers may encourage banks to supply a wide range of services.  
  The  specification  of  the  revenue  function  is  also  affected  by  competitive 
assumptions. A standard revenue function approach would assume perfect competition 
in bank markets, where banks are price-takers in both input and output markets. In a 
competitive  environment,  prices  are  exogenous.  However,  the  perfect  competition 
hypothesis does not seem to be plausible in most banking markets, where a certain 
degree of market power is observed (Berger et al., 1996; Berger and Mester, 1997; 
Humphrey and Pulley, 1997). Banks have a degree of control over the level of output 
prices  charged,  and  thus  output  price  exogeneity  does  not  apply  to  many  banking 
products.  Therefore,  it  is  necessary  to  specify  an  alternative  revenue  function  that   23 
permits the use of a more accurately measured metric-output quantity (y) to improve the 
local identification of revenues, and thus profits. There will be a given vector of on and 
off-balance sheet outputs (y), a vector of inputs (x) and also a vector of netputs Q = (y, -
x) = (Q1,…, Qm, -x1, …, -xn). An indirect revenue function (R) is defined to analyze 
revenue  scope  economies.  The  revenue  problem  seeks  to  maximize  the  revenue 
function: 
      '      s.t.    ( , , ) 0 = =
p Max R p y g p y r              (5) 
where  p  and  r  are  vectors  of  output  prices  and  input  prices,  respectively.  The 
Lagrangian yields the revenue maximizing prices as functions of y and r: 
    '     ( , )'      ( , ) = = = R p y p y r y R y r       (6)  
  The  definition  of  global  scope  revenue  economies  compares  complete 
specialization  with  joint  production  of  financial  services.  However,  as  Pulley  and 
Braunstein  (1992)  and  Berger  et  al.  (1996)  note,  complete  specialization  is  not  a 
realistic view of bank production; it may be more appropriate to consider banks as 
‘quasi-specialized’ institutions. Quasi-specialization does not necessarily mean that a 
bank produces the same proportion of all outputs jointly (which would be the standard 
definition of scope economies), but also includes banks having different specialization 
levels. Revenue scope economies are estimated using a composite function, and the 
specification of the quasi-specialization scope economies and the composite function 
are given in Appendix A. 
  To estimate the composite function, three inputs (k = 1, …,3) are used: the price 
of deposits, labor and physical capital. In parallel, two definitions of the output mix are   24 
considered  to estimate  changes  in consumer  willingness  to  pay  with  regard  to  card 
services
23: 
-  Three-output vector: loans, deposits and other earning assets. 
-  Five-output  vector:  loans,  deposits,  other  earning  assets,  value  of  card 
transactions at ATMs and value of card transactions at POS. 
  The  revenues considered include  all sources of  income from loans, deposits, 
other earning assets for the three-output definition plus the revenues from card services 
in the case of the five-output definition. Since our database permits us to separate card 
transactions and revenues from own and competitors’ customers (both cardholders and 
merchants) the revenue from cards only includes income flows for own customers, who 
are those that evaluate bank services
24. However, considering card revenues as a whole 
allows us to identify whether indirect network effects exist. Specifically, the difference 
between revenue scope economies from all sources of card income and revenue scope 
economies from own customers will be an accurate proxy of ‘indirect’ network effects.      
  Equation (6) was estimated using iterative non-linear least squares routines with 
fixed  effects
25.  Importantly,  differences  between revenue  scope economies  from  the 
five-output vector composite function and revenue scope economies from the three-
output vector composite function will demonstrate the net contribution of cards to the 
joint valuation of bank services. Similarly, the specific contribution of card services at 
                                                
23 The difference between the estimated intercepts of the three-output and the five-output definitions of 
the  revenue  functions  may  represent  a  change  in  the  scale  economies  (Lau,  2000).  Recall  that 
subadditivity is a combination of scope and scale effects and, therefore, a change in scale would affect the 
scope results. In our case, the differences between the intercepts of both output mix definitions were not 
found to be statistically significant (not shown). Hence, our scope economies estimations are robust to 
changes in scale. 
24 Additionally, various control factors were included, namely: own and competitors’ ATMs; own and 
competitors’ POS terminals; and own branches. These controls reflect various non-price characteristics 
that may reflect different investments in the card markets. These variables improve the goodness of fit of 
the regressions. 
25 We  use  non-linear  methods in  which  concavity  conditions  for  costs and  convexity  conditions  for 
revenues were always fulfilled.   25 
ATMs (alternatively, at POS terminals) can also be assessed by setting output quantities 
and revenues from card use at POS terminals (alternatively, at ATMs) to zero. 
 
  4.5.  Changes  in  the willingness  to  pay  and  market  power:  the  effects  of 
payment cards 
Since the basic structure of our revenue function model may introduce a certain 
bias into our estimations of consumer willingness to pay, due to market power, we aim 
to distinguish between the two effects by employing the so-called ‘mark-up’ model 
proposed by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982). This procedure has been already applied 
to the US (Shaffer, 1989) and Canada (1993) using aggregate national data. The ‘mark-
up’ test estimates the extent to which the average firm's perceived marginal revenue 
deviates from demand, and thus demonstrates the degree of market power exercised by 
banks. Profit-maximizing firms will establish a marginal cost equal to their perceived 
marginal  revenue.  This  marginal  revenue  will  coincide  with  the  demand  price  in  a 
situation of competitive equilibrium, but with the industry's marginal revenue in the 
collusive extreme.  
Following  Bresnahan  (1982),  the  true  marginal  revenue  function  may  be 
represented as p + h(y,S,d), where p is the industry price, y is the vector of outputs 
(y=(Q1,…, Qm), S is a vector of exogenous variables and d is a vector of demand system 
parameters to be estimated. The bank’s perceived marginal revenue function may be 
expressed as P+λh(y,S,d), where h(y,S,d) equals the semi-elasticity of market demand 
for bank products ( /( / ) ∂ ∂ y y p ) and λ is the market structure parameter to be estimated;  
this represents the extent to which banks recognize the distinction between demand and 
marginal  revenue  functions,  ranging  from  λ=0,  (perfectly  competitive  behavior  and 
marginal cost pricing) to λ=1 (joint monopoly or perfect collusion).    26 
  As  Shaffer  states  (1993),  -λ  constitutes  a  local  estimate  of  the  percentage 
deviation of aggregate output from the competitive equilibrium level, so that the actual 
price deviates locally from the competitive price (marginal cost) by -λ /( / ) ∂ ∂ y y p  and 
the actual quantity deviates locally from the competitive output level by -λy. Dividing 
by y gives the percentage quantity deviation from the competitive level.   
   Shaffer  (1989,  1993)  proposes  an  empirical  implementation  in  which  the 
estimation of λ is based on a simultaneous estimation of an inverse demand function 
and a supply relation. Our model is constructed using a similar procedure, although our 
equations  are  derived  from  bank-level  data  using  panel  data  techniques  and  fixed 
effects. The demand function is specified as:   
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 it it t it t t it t t i it y a a p a S a p Z a Z a p S a S Z e t µ = + + + + + + + +      (7) 
  The  it y in equation (7) represents the total output quantity that the bank i offers 
at time t, and  it p is the price of such services. Equation (7) may thus be expressed as an 
equation for either the three-output or the five-output specification of y. In our model 
for  panel  data,  it y   is  then  either  the  sum  of  the  quantities  of  our  three-output 
specification (loans, deposits and other earning assets) or the sum of the quantities of 
the five-output vector specification (loan, deposits, other earning assets, value of card 
transactions  at  ATMs  and  value  of  card  transactions  at  POS).  Similarly,  it p is  a 
weighted average price for these services, using the relative weight of each output in 
total assets as a weighting factor. In our model the exogenous variable S is GDP. Z is 
another  exogenous  variable  which  represents  the  price  of  a  substitute  for  banking 
services. The stock exchange index of prices would seem to be a reasonable proxy of   27 
this substitute
26. Equation (7) also includes a vector of bank fixed-effects (µi) and an 
error term (εit )
27.      
  In order to obtain a supply relationship, a marginal cost function must first be 
derived. Our multiproduct composite specification permits us to define a cost function 
whose form essentially resembles that of the revenue equation shown in Appendix A. 
The reduced-form composite cost (C) equation would be: 
 
( ) ( ) = { ( ,ln )   exp[ (ln )]}    
φ φ ε ≅ + C F q r G r                      (8) 
and therefore the supply relation derived from the marginal cost function, under the 
assumptions that banks are input price-takers and profit-maximizers, is: 
         1 3 5 1 /( ) / it it t t i t it p y a a Z a S C Q
θ
δ λ δ µ ε = − + + + ∂ ∂ + + ∑              (9) 
where  1 3 5 /( ) it t t y a a Z a S λ − + +   is  the  deviation  of  prices  from  marginal  costs.  The 
empirical procedure involves the simultaneous estimation of (7) and (9). Once more, 
non-linear  least  squares  routines  with  fixed  effects  are  employed  to  estimate  these 
equations.  
  Since the estimation of λ is a tool to estimate quantity and price percentage 
deviations  from  competitive  equilibrium  models,  it  is  also  possible  to  compute  the 
percentage deviation in revenues as the product of deviations in quantities and prices.   
Equations (7) and (9) are estimated using both the three-output and the five-output mix 
definitions.  Differences  in  estimated  deviation  in  revenues  between  the  two 
specifications will show the contribution of cards to bank market power. Finally, this 
percentage deviation in revenues can be deducted from the scope economies estimation 
to obtain a net valuation of card services provided jointly  with other bank outputs.
   
                                                
26 As an alternative, we also employed a 10-year government bond; the econometric outcomes were very 
similar. 
27 The interaction terms p times Z, p times S, and S times Z allow for demand curve rotation.   28 
5. Results 
  5.1. Market power and multiproduct setting definitions 
The prices, estimated marginal costs (from the supply relation) and mark-ups (of 
price over marginal costs) of the different products of the posited bank output bundle 
are  shown  in  Table  2.  These  results  reveal  the  existence  of  higher  mark-ups  (and 
therefore,  market  power)  for  loans  and  other  earning  assets,  compared  to  card 
transactions at ATMs or POS. Deposits apparently act as loss leaders (i.e. they have 
negative mark-ups) to attract customers to use the entire bundle of products. 
The  estimation of the different mark-ups  and Lerner  indices is based on the 
estimated  marginal  costs  from  the  five-output  composite  function.  However,  these 
results are only reliable if cards can be effectively considered as part of the output 
bundle i.e. if they belong to the same relevant bank retail market. The results of the 
SSNIP test (Table 3) reveal that there  is  a significant and non-transitory change  in 
profits for both a 5% and a 10% increase in prices. This change in profits is 3.84% in 
the case of the three-output definitions but may rise to 5.70% when cards are added. 
Therefore, we conclude that the definition of the multi-output setting is consistent with 
the market definition.  
Finally, the two-sided nature of the card services is also tested, using a series of 
log-linear demand functions (Table 4). The panel data results reveal that both the prices 
charged to cardholders and merchants affect total card transactions and, therefore, the 
market for payment cards seem to be two-sided. Total price (as the sum of cardholders’ 
and merchants’ prices) is also significant and, according to theoretical assumptions, this 
is the relevant price to measure changes in market power related to banks' supply of 
card services. 
   29 
5.2. Hedonic regressions: results 
  The contribution of own and competitors’ network characteristics to consumers’ 
valuation are explained in a series of hedonic regressions given in Table 5. The panel 
data model is estimated using a random effects routine which, according to Hausman 
tests, is preferable here to fixed-effects estimation. The results reveal that customers 
tend  to  value  competitors’  ATMs  density.  Similarly,  they  appear  to  value  the  POS 
terminals density positively and significantly, no matter if these belong to their own 
banks or to others banks. Thus, no-surcharging rules seemingly imply a valuation of 
POS, no matter which bank is the acquirer. Additionally, the interaction terms show that 
competitors’  ATMs  (column  I)  and  POS  terminals  (column  II)  seem  to  generate  a 
positive externality on the own card issuance, as own bank customers benefit from other 
bank ATM and POS devices. However, the interaction between own ATMs and card 
growth only seems to affect negatively and significantly the willingness to pay for POS 
services.  The  interaction  between  card  growth  and  the  deployment  of  own  POS 
terminals has a positive and significant effect on the willingness to pay for POS services 
and a negative and significant effect on the willingness to pay for ATM services. The 
hedonic  regressions  also  reveal  the  existence  of  certain  substitution  relationships 
between ATMs and POS. In particular, the density of own bank POS terminals (ATMs) 
is  negatively  related  to  the  price  of  card  use  at  ATMs  (POS).  Furthermore,  the 
development of bank branches appears to be positively related to card service prices, 
suggesting the existence of complementarities between traditional and non-traditional 
non-price characteristics of banking.  
In this hedonic approach, and for the sake of consistency, the market power 
variable  employed  is  the  λ  coefficient  from  the  ‘mark-up’  test,  which  is  estimated 
individually and over time by evaluating the estimated parameters of equations (7) and   30 
(9) at the bank level. Importantly, this estimation involves the identification of the total 
price of cards as the relevant price for card markets (according to our test of the two-
sided nature of cards). As expected, the effect of market power on card transaction 
prices  at  both  ATMs  and  POS  is  positive  and  significant.  With  regard  to  control 
variables, growth in card numbers is apparently negatively related to the willingness to 
pay for card services at ATMs, a result which indicates that consumers diversify the use 
of cards as card markets become more mature. Regional population density and GDP 
are negatively and significantly related to prices, as a reflection of higher competition in 
more developed and urban territories. Finally, regional salary levels, as an important 
source of differences in costs, have a positive impact on prices.  
 
5.3. Multiproduct banking and the willingness to pay: results for cards 
The  estimations  of  consumers’  willingness  to  pay  are  initially  obtained  as 
complementarities  in  consumption  from  the  three-output  (loans,  deposits  and  other 
earning assets) composite revenue function
28. The scope economies are found to be 
negative and significant (-2.6%) for the joint consumption of traditional bank products, 
a  result  that  is  in  line  with  Berger  et  al.  (1996)  for  the  U.S
29.  Furthermore,  these 
diseconomies  are found  to  diminish  and  to  reach  virtually  zero  when  moving  from 
complete diversification ( 0 ∈= ) to complete specialization ( 0.3 ∈= ). As expected, fixed-
scope economies are zero in the case of revenues, meaning that diseconomies result 
from  negative  complementarities  among  the  three  outputs
30.  However,  the  results 
change with the five-output bundle definition (loans, deposits, other earning assets, card 
transactions  at  ATMs  and  card  transactions  at  POS  terminals).  Interestingly,  these 
                                                
28 The long-list of estimated composite function parameters is not shown here, for the sake of simplicity. 
29 See also Carbó and Rodríguez (2005), who provide similar evidence for Spain. 
30 Berger et al. (1996) find positive values for revenue fixed-scope economies, although they consider 
these results as spurious since, unlike costs, revenues do not have a fixed component for zero output 
values.   31 
results show that the expected economies of scope among bank products only come to 
light when a broad definition of the output mix, including card services, is considered. 
Revenue  complementarities  in  consumption  then  become  positive  and  significant 
(2.3%). This result implies that by including card services in the output mix, scope 
economies increase by 4.9%; this is unsurprising, since modern banking services cannot 
be fully understood without considering payment and related card services and defining 
the different sources of interest and fee income (Rogers and Sinkey, 1999; Wheelock 
and Wilson, 2001; Stiroh, 2004). Thus, our results reinforce this view of cards as one of 
the main influences of customers’ willingness to pay for the bundle of bank services. 
However,  according  to  the  definition  of  the  revenue  function  in  (6),  these 
complementarities may be somewhat biased, as they might be also a result of market 
power. 
 
   5.4. Willingness to pay and market power: results 
5.4.1. Changes in market power related to card services 
  To distinguish consumers’ “willingness to pay” from market power influences, a 
simultaneous estimation of the demand and supply relations in (7) and (9) is performed, 
to  obtain  the  deviation  of  actual  quantities  (-λ),  prices  ((-λ /( / ) ∂ ∂ y y p )  and, 
consequently, revenues from competitive equilibrium levels.   
  The estimated parameters of equations (7) and (9) are shown in Appendix B. 
Interestingly, the intercept of the estimated demand equation increases when cards are 
included  in  the  output  bundle,  thereby  suggesting  that  reservation  prices  (and 
consumers’ willingness to pay) also increase when cards are included. Table 6 shows 
the deviation from competitive equilibrium for the ‘traditional’ three-output definition 
(‘balance sheet assets’) and the five-output definition, which includes card services at   32 
ATMs  and  POS.  The  estimates  of  -λ  are  also  reported  yearly  and  as  bootstrapped 
confidence intervals
31. Both the point estimates and the confidence intervals reveal a 
certain degree of market power in the traditional output mix specification (0.147). The 
deviation  from  competitive  equilibrium  is  even  higher  in  the  five-output  mix 
specification (0.263) which, in turn, suggests that card services provide a degree of 
additional market power. The two estimates significantly differed, according to standard 
mean-difference tests. The deviation from competitive equilibrium in the three-output 
specification  implies  a  reduction  in  prices  of  9.9%  and  an  increase  in  revenues  of 
1.15%. The introduction of card services produces an additional negative deviation of 
prices of 9.7% and an additional increase in revenues of 1.29%.   
 
  5.4.2. Estimated indirect network effects and total change in willingness to pay 
  The  estimated increase in market power must be  deducted from the revenue 
provided  by  consumers’  willingness  to  pay  (complementarities  in  consumption),  in 
order to obtain an estimation of the net change in willingness to pay when providing 
card  services  jointly  with  other  bank  outputs.  However,  this  calculation  must  also 
include the indirect revenue effect which may arise from customers of other banks using 
ATMs or POS terminals of the bank in question and, vice versa, from own customers 
using  ATMs  and  POS  terminals  of  other  banks.  These  indirect  network  effects  are 
estimated as the difference between scope economies from a total revenue function and 
scope economies  from the baseline revenue function  (which only includes revenues 
from  own  bank  customers).  The  outcomes  of  these consumer  valuation  and  market 
power sources are summarized in Table 7. Indirect revenue effects were found to be 
both positive (0.35% on average) and significant. Adding these effects to the standard 
                                                
31 We follow the specification of Eakin et al. (1990) to compute bootstrapped confidence intervals for 
multi-output technologies.   33 
valuation  produces  a  total  revenue  complementarities  value  of  2.98%.  Since  the 
estimated revenue deviation from competitive levels is 2.24%, there is a net positive 
effect on willingness to pay of 0.52% for payment card services jointly provided with 
loans, deposits and other earning assets.  
  The  revenue  function  specification  also  permits  the  analysis  of  the  specific 
contribution of ATM or POS card transactions to willingness to pay and market power 
influences (not shown). Revenue complementarities from POS transactions were found 
to be larger (1.83%) than those from ATMs (0.71%). Similarly, indirect network effects 
were also larger for POS (0.22%) than for ATM transactions (0.15%). Furthermore, the 
revenue  deviation  from  competitive  equilibrium  in  ATM  transactions  (0.87%)  was 
double that produced by POS transactions (0.42%).  
   
  5.4.3. An additional robustness check for several levels of bank investments  
  Overall,  the  results  in  Tables  6  and  7  suggest  that,  although  banks  increase 
market power by offering card services, their customers are willing to pay for such 
services and the net effect on willingness to pay turns out to be positive. In order to 
combine the former inference, obtained from the hedonic regressions, with the welfare 
effects of the demand and supply relationships estimated, we undertake an additional 
robustness check. In particular, we examine whether bank investments are conditioned 
by  pricing  policies,  and  if  banks  with  larger  investments  (in  both  ATMs  and  POS 
terminals) are rewarded by a greater increase in consumers’ willingness to pay, indirect 
network effects and/or market power. To this end, the principal empirical procedures are 
repeated for three sub-samples. These sub-samples distinguish between banks which are 
over and  below the median values of three measures: the ‘cards/deposits’ ratio, the 
growth rate of ATMs and the growth rate of POS. The breakdown of results is presented   34 
in Table 8. Employing any of the three indicators showing the relative investments in 
the card industry, there appears to be a higher willingness to pay for those services 
supplied by banks making larger investments. Although both willingness to pay and the 
market power effects are higher for such banks, the net welfare effect is highly positive 
and significant. The differences between high-investment and low-investment banks are 
lower in terms of indirect network effects, since the customers of banks with lower 
ATM or POS investment may reap relatively higher benefits from network effects. 
 
6. Conclusions and policy implications   
  This paper aims to contribute to the literature of network industries in two ways. 
First, we provide evidence on changes in market power related to the supply of card 
payment services at multiproduct banks and the willingness of bank customers to pay 
for  those  services.  Secondly,  we  estimate  the  welfare  effects  of  incorporating  such 
payment services to the bank multi-output set. In accordance to industry structure, the 
specific  pricing  structure  and  network  effects  of  payment  cards  are  estimated  and 
incorporated into the estimations of market power and willingness to pay. 
  To our knowledge, the literature to date has offered limited empirical evidence 
regarding  the  willingness  to  pay  in  network  industries.  This  paper  offers  empirical 
evidence on this issue, using a typical network industry such as payment cards. Using a 
unique  database  of  Spanish  banks,  we  design  an  empirical  strategy  to  separate  the 
willingness to pay for the sum of debit and credit card services (jointly provided with 
other bank products) from the market power effect of including card payment services 
in the bank output bundle. A hedonic approach is initially applied, in order to analyze 
the  effects  of  various  characteristics  of  own  bank  and  competitors’  strategies  upon 
customer evaluation of card services. The measurement of consumers’ willingness to   35 
pay  also  comprises  the  estimation  of  revenue  scope  economies,  using  composite 
revenue functions. The effect of market power is subsequently estimated, employing a 
so-called ‘mark-up’ model that allows us to estimate the deviation of revenues from 
perfect competition.  
  The empirical results reveal that there is a net positive welfare effect of card 
services provided jointly with other bank products, even when market power influences 
are controlled. The positive change in consumers’ willingness to pay extends to both 
ATM and POS transactions separately. Furthermore, indirect network effects appear to 
be  a  significant  component  of  this  joint  valuation.  Interestingly,  banks  making  the 
greatest investments in cards, ATMs and POS seem to enjoy these revenue advantages 
and valuation to a significantly larger extent, although a certain degree of substitution 
between ATMs and POS also appears to exist.  
  Card markets are peculiar in that their market structure is two-sided and their 
competitive features should not be treated as a standard, vertically organized, market. In 
addition, the estimated market power indicators in this study reveal that the deviation 
from fully competitive standards of card prices is similar to that of other bank products. 
Consequently, any antitrust policy which ignores the full welfare effects of cards and, in 
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APPENDIX A: REVENUE SCOPE ECONOMIES AND THE SPECIFICATION 
OF THE COMPOSITE FUNCTION 
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where  m  is  the  number  of  outputs  (Qi,  i=1,…,m)  and  ∈  is  the  proportion  of  non-
specialized outputs produced; thus, when ∈=0, expression (A1) becomes the standard 
measure of global scope economies
32.  
  A  composite  function  is  employed  to  model  the  behavior  of  revenues  in  a 
multiproduct  framework.  Compared  with  other  commonly  used  (e.g.  translog  or 
quadratic) functional forms, the composite function produces more robust and efficient 
results when modeling multiproduct technologies
33; it admits zero values for output, 
does not impose separability between output and input prices and allows for zero or 
negative  values  of  the  dependent  variables,  which  is  likely  to  occur  in  the  case  of 
revenues. A generalized composite cost revenue function is, then, defined as a Box-Cox 
transformation of total revenues (R), outputs (Qi) and natural logs of input prices (ln rk): 
 
                                                
32 Note that when ∈>0 we obtain different measures of subadditivity, capturing scope economies for a 
given  output  mix  ranging  from  complete  diversification  ( 0 ∈= )  to  different  levels  of  specialization 
(higher values of  ∈).  Therefore, QCSE is an empirical subadditivity measure, since we are able to 
estimate scope economies with simultaneous changes in scale and product mix. Institutional size becomes 
very relevant at this point since specialization and subadditivity change with bank output level. 
33 The composite actually nests a standard translog, a generalized translog and quadratic functional forms. 
Multiplicative forms, such as the translog, usually impose separability between inputs and outputs, and 
input demand elasticities are defined equally and independently of changes in input prices. As Carroll and 
Ruppert  (1984)  and  Snee  (1986)  state,  the  composite  function  offers  an  alternative  specification  by 
transforming both sides of the cost (profit or revenue equation) and permitting us to model empirically the 
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where Qi are the output quantities (i= 1,..., n+m), and rK is the vector of input prices (k 
= 1,…n). Thus, the composite in (A2) will adopt a logarithmic form when φ = 0, while 













                                                
34  φ  is  introduced  as  a  parameter  to  be  estimated  so  that  the  equation  structure  is  itself  a  testable 
hypothesis. However, the composite is non-linear and must  be estimated  iteratively.  Non-linear least 
squares routines are employed to estimate φ and all the other revenue function parameters in equation 
(4)
34. In particular, equation (4) is estimated using a pseudo-model (Pulley and Braunstein, 1992) defining 
the geometric mean of total revenues as R*.   38 
APPENDIX B: ESTIMATED PARAMETERS OF THE SIMULTANEOUS 
ESTIMATION OF DEMAND AND SUPPLY RELATIONS  
FROM THE ‘MARK-UP’ MODEL    
Non-linear least squares simultaneous estimation (with fixed effects) of the system of 
equations: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 it it t it t t it t t i it y a a p a S a p Z a Z a p S a S Z e t µ = + + + + + + + +  
1 3 5 1 /( ) / it it t t i t it p y a a Z a S C Q
θ
δ λ δ µ ε = − + + + ∂ ∂ + + ∑  
standard errors in parentheses   
 
Three-output definition 
(loans, deposits and other 
earning assets) 
Five-output definition 
(loans, deposits, other 
earning assets, card 
transactions at ATMs and 
card transactions at POS) 





































2  0.71  0.79 
 
* statistically significant at 10% level   
**  statistically significant at 5% level 
***  statistically significant at 1% level   39 
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TABLE 1. VARIABLE DEFINITION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
  Definition  Mean  Std. dev. 
Loans (millions of euros)  Outstanding value of customer loans at quarter-end.  3511.31  4403.11 
Other earning assets (millions of euros)  Outstanding value of shares and securities at quarter-end.  1847.28  2942.96 
Deposits (millions of euros)  Outstanding value of customer deposits at quarter-end.  3728.44  4980.08 
Value of card transactions at ATM (millions of 
euros) 
Outstanding value of card transactions at ATMs at quarter-
end.  224.2  316.27 
Value of card transactions at POS terminals 
(millions of euros) 
Outstanding value of card transactions at POS terminals at 
quarter-end.  71.37  82.98 
Total revenue (millions of euros)  Total bank revenue including interest and non-interest 
income.  342.27  256.88 
Total revenue excluding indirect network 
effects  (millions of euros) 
Total bank revenue including interest and non-interest 
income, minus revenues from the use of cards at own ATMs 
and POS terminals by non-bank customers. 
 
328.15  249.22 
Total costs (millions of euros)  Total costs including interest and operating costs.  297.16  216.23 
Price of deposits   Interest paid on deposits/outstanding value of deposits at 
quarter-end.  0.0224  0.0128 
Price of labor (euros/worker)  Salaries/workers.  1636.1  2148.3 
Price of physical capital  Interest paid on deposits/outstanding value of deposits at 
quarter-end.  0.1645  0.1252 
Price of card use at ATM   Revenues from card transactions at ATMs/value of 
transactions at ATM  0.019  0.028 
Price of card use at POS   Revenues from card transactions at POS/value of card 
transactions at POS  0.023  0.037 
Average price of deposits, loans and other 
earning assets  
Capital depreciation expenditures/value of physical capital at 
year-end.  0.0749  0.0660 
Average price of deposits, loans, other 
earning assets and card services 
Revenues from loan, other earning assets and 
deposits/outstanding value of loans, deposits and other 
earning assets at quarter-end. 
0.0792  0.0688 
Stock price index  The average quarterly growth of IBEX-35  0.0613  0.0568 
Own ATM density  Number of own ATMs per square kilometer in the territories 
where the bank operates.  0.3522  0.2271 
Competitors’ ATM density  Number of competitors’ ATMs per square kilometer in the 
territories where the bank operates.  0.8016  0.3593 
Own POS terminals density  Number of own POS terminals per square kilometer in the 
territories where the bank operates.  0.6427  0.5508 
Competitors’ POS terminals density  Number of competitors’ POS terminals per square kilometer 
in the territories where the bank operates.  1.1227  0.9244 
Own branches  Number of own branches  0.0324  0.0320 
Card growth  Quarterly growth rate of cards  0.0692  0.0497 
Regional GDP (millions of euros)  Regional gross-domestic product (in real terms)  39246.4  22151.1 
Regional population density  Inhabitants per square kilometer  63.27  25.56 
Regional salary level (euros)  Salary per employee at the regional level  1274.15  587.22 
 
Data sources: All the quantities and prices of bank assets, card services, ATMs and POS terminals have been provided by the Spanish 
Confederation of Savings Banks (CECA). Regional GDP, population density and salary levels have been obtained from the Spanish 
















TABLE 2. ESTIMATED MARKET POWER INDICATORS FOR THE POSITED BANK 
OUTPUTS 
 
Marginal costs estimated from a multiproduct composite cost function 
  Price  Marginal costs  Mark-up  Lerner 
index 
Loans  0.049  0.039  0.010  0.204 
Deposits  0.018  0.019  -0.001  -0.056 
Other earning assets  0.063  0.032  0.031  0.492 
Card transactions at POS  0.063  0.059  0.004  0.063 
Card transactions at ATMs  0.092  0.061  0.031  0.337 










































TABLE 3. SSNIP TEST FOR CHANGES IN PROFITS (%) WITHIN A 












































The SSNIP test is defined as the Small, but Significant, Non-transitory Increase 
in Price that results in a significant change in profits. In this table, the profit- 
maximizing bank offers a set of products (J) which alternatively corresponds to 
the three-output or five-output (including card transactions) definitions of the 
multi-output production function. The SSNIP is implemented for the standard 
5% and 10% variation in prices. Prices  are  set constant at  their means  for 
































Change in prices 
Three-output definition 
(loans, deposits and other 
earning assets) 
Five-output definition 
(loans, deposits, other 
earning assets, card 
transactions at ATMs and 
card transactions at POS) 
5%  -1.92  -2.85 
10%  -3.84  -5.70   48 
TABLE 4. PAYMENT CARDS AS TWO-SIDED MARKETS: TEST OF THE 
SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGES IN THE PRICES CHARGED TO 
CARDHOLDERS (pc), MERCHANTS (pm) AND OF TOTAL PRICES ON THE 






























Fixed effects estimations of a linear approximation to demand curves 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
 
Log (cardholders price)  -0.3907*** 
(-11.32)  -  - 
Log (merchants price)  -  -0.2118*** 
(-11.12)  - 
Log (total price of cards)  -  -  -0.5166*** 
(-18.90) 



















2  0.96  0.96  0.97 
* statistically significant at 10% level 
**  statistically significant at 5% level 
***  statistically significant at 1% level   49 
TABLE 5. HEDONIC REGRESSIONS: PRICES AND SERVICE 
CHARACTERISTICS 
     
 





Panel data regressions (random effects model) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
(I) 
log(Price of card use at 
ATM) 
(II) 
log(Price of card use at 
POS) 





































log [ (competitors’ ATMs) x 













log [ (competitors’ POS 













































2  0.80  0.78 
* statistically significant at 10% level 
**  statistically significant at 5% level 
***  statistically significant at 1% level   50 


























Bootstrapped confidence intervals in parentheses 
 
  Three-output definition 
(loans, deposits and other earning assets) 
Five-output definition (loans, deposits, other earning 








 (-λ λ λ λ) 
Local  deviation of 
actual prices from 
competitive price  
levels 










 (-λ λ λ λ) 










1997  0.132 
(0.109,0.150)  0.097  1.132  0.252 
(0.227,0,297)  0.098  1.270 
1998  0.136 
(0.112,0.154)  0.098  1.143  0.256 
(0.229,0.301)  0.098  1.282 
1999  0.138 
(0.110,0.159)  0.099  1.146  0.257 
(0.231,0.302)  0.099  1.283 
2000  0.139 
(0.103,0.160)  0.099  1.150  0.265 
(0.240,0.310)  0.099  1.296 
2001  0.148 
(0.120,0.195)  1.002  1.158  0.274 
(0.250,0.304)  0.099  1.313 
2002  0.153 
(0.137,0.198)  1.003  1.160  0.269 
(0.243,0.319)  0.097  1.302 
2003  0.161 
(0.142,0.213)  1.009  1.162  0.261 
(0.240,0.316)  0.099  1.299 
1997-2003  0.147 
(0.122,0.202)  0.099  1.158  0.263 
(0.241,0.313)  0.098  1.298 
 
* All estimated λ values are statistically significant at the 5 per cent level (as a minimum). See also estimations in Appendix B.   51 
 
TABLE 7. ESTIMATED CHANGE IN BANK CONSUMERS’ WILLINGNESS TO PAY 






























Willingness to pay estimates obtained from yearly evaluated composite function parameters* 





consumption from card 
services supplied jointly 
with bank balance-sheet 





Total increase in 
consumers’ 
willingness to pay  
(A) 




(balance sheet plus 
card services) 
(B) 
Estimated net change in 
willingness to pay (as a 
percentage of bank 
revenues) 
(A)-(B) 
1997  2.32  0.28  2.60  2.402  0.20 
1998  2.51  0.29  2.80  2.425  0.38 
1999  2.60  0.30  2.90  2.429  0.47 
2000  2.71  0.32  3.03  2.446  0.58 
2001  2.58  0.32  2.90  2.471  0.43 
2002  2.80  0.38  3.18  2.462  0.72 
2003  2.92  0.41  3.33  2.461  0.87 
1997-2003  2.63  0.35  2.98  2.456  0.52 
* All estimated values are statistically significant, at the 5 per cent level (as a minimum) (∈= 0.0 ) 
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TABLE 8. ESTIMATIONS OF THE WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR CARD 
SERVICES. ROBUSTNESS CHECK FOR DIFFERENT LEVELS OF BANK 

















Consumer valuation estimates obtained from yearly evaluated composite function parameters* 
Revenues deviation from competitive equilibrium models obtained from a simultaneous estimation of demand and supply relationship functions 
 
NOTE: LOW and HIGH refer to the estimates for those banks below or over the median value of the selected criterion, respectively. These 
values were found significantly different in all cases according to mean difference tests.  
 
  CARDS/DEPOSITS  ATMs GROWTH  POS GROWTH 
  LOW  HIGH  LOW  HIGH  LOW  HIGH 
Complementarities in consumption 
from card services supplied jointly 
with bank balance-sheet assets (% 
revenues) 
2.16  2.88  2.47  2.68  2.12  2.93 
Indirect network effects (% revenues)  0.37  0.35  0.39  0.32  0.42  0.3 
Total increase in consumers’ 
willingness to pay  
(A) 
2.53  3.23  2.86  3.00  2.54  3.23 
% revenue deviation from competitive 
equilibrium 
(balance sheet plus card services) 
(B) 
2.36  2.57  2.42  2.53  2.38  2.48 
Estimated net change in 
willingness to pay (as a 
percentage of bank revenues) 
(A)-(B) 
0.17  0.66  0.44  0.47  0.16  0.75 
* All estimated values are statistically significant, at least, at the 5 per cent level (as a minimum)  (∈= 0.0) 
   53 
FIGURE 1. THE INTRODUCTION OF CARDS IN THE OUTPUT BUNDLE, 
SCENARIO 1: INCREASES IN CONSUMERS’ SURPLUS AND BANKS’ 





















































yD1 =(Q1,…, Qm-1, 0) 
yD2 =(Q1,…, Qm-1, Qc) 














   
 
 







     




























yD2 =(Q1,…, Qm-1, Qc) 
yD1 =(Q1,…, Qm-1, 0) 
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FIGURE 2. THE INTRODUCTION OF CARDS IN THE OUTPUT BUNDLE, 
SCENARIO 2: A DECREASE IN CONSUMERS’ SURPLUS AND AN 




























































yD2 =(Q1,…, Qm-1, Qc) 
yD1 =(Q1,…, Qm-1, 0) 









   
 
 








   
 
























yD2 =(Q1,…, Qm-1, Qc) 
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